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®ED The Committee for Economic Development 
The Committee for Economic Development is composed of 
200 leading businessmen and educators. 
CED is devoted to these basic objectives: 
1) To develop, through objective research and discussion, findings and 
recommendations for business and public policy which will contribute 
to the preservation and strengthening of our free society, and to the 
maintenance of high employment, increasing productivity and living 
standards, greater economic stability and greater opportunity for all 
our people. 
2) To bring about increasing public understanding of the importance of 
these objectives and the ways in which they can be achieved. 
CED's work is supported by voluntary contributions from business and 
industry. It is nonprofit, nonpartisan and nonpolitical. 
The Trustees, who generally are Presidents or Board Chairmen of cor-
porations and Presidents of universities, are chosen for their individual 
capacities rather than as representatives of any particular interests. They 
unite scholarship with business judgment and experience in analyzing the 
issues and developing recommendations to resolve the economic problems 
that constantly arise in a dynamic and democratic society. 
Through this business-academic partnership, CED endeavors to develop 
policy statements and other research products that commend themselves 
as guides to public and business policy; for use as texts in college economic 
and political science courses and in management training courses; for con-
sideration and discussion by newspaper and magazine editors, columnists 
and commentators, and for distribution abroad to promote better under-
standing of the American economic system. 
CED believes that by enabling businessmen to demonstrate constructively 
their concern for the general welfare, it is helping business to earn and 
maintain the national and community respect essential to the successful 
functioning of the free enterprise capitalist system. 
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The Responsibility for 
CED Statements on National Policy 
This statement has been approved for publication by the members of the Re-
search and Policy Committee and of the Committee for Improvement of 
Management in Government, subject to individual dissents or reservations 
noted herein. The individuals who are responsible for this statement are listed 
on the opposite page. Company or institutional associations are included 
for identification only; the companies or institutions do not share in the re-
sponsibility borne by the individual members of the two committees. 
The Research and Policy Committee is directed by CED's bylaws to: 
"Initiate studies into the principles of business policy and of public policy 
which will foster the full contribution by industry and commerce to the attain-
ment and maintenance of high and secure standards of living for people in all 
walks of life through maximum employment and high productivity in the 
domestic economy." 
The bylaws emphasize that: 
"All research is to be thoroughly objective in character, and the approach 
in each instance is to be from the standpoint of the general welfare and not 
from that of any special political or economic group." 
The Research and Policy Committee is composed of 50 Trustees from 
among the 200 businessmen and educators who comprise the Committee for 
Economic Development. It is aided by a Research Advisory Board of leading 
economists, a small permanent Research Staff, and by advisers chosen for their 
competence in the field being considered. 
Each Statement on National Policy is preceded by discussions, meetings, 
and exchanges of memoranda, often stretching over many months. The research 
is undertaken by a subcommittee, with its advisers. For this statement the Com-
mittee for Improvement of Management in Government acted as a subcom-
mittee. lt together with the full Research and Policy Committee participated 
in the drafting of findings and recommendations. 
Except for the members of the Research and Policy Committee and the 
Committee for Improvement of Management in Government, the recommenda-
tions presented herein are not necessarily endorsed by other Trustees or by the 
advisers, contributors, staff members, or others associated with CED. 
The Research and Policy Committee offers this Statement on National 
Policy as an aid to clearer understanding of steps to be taken in achieving 
improvement in the operations of the American economy. The Committee is 
not attempting to pass on any pending specific legislative proposals; its purpose 
is to urge careful consideration of the objectives set forth in the statement and 
of the best means of accomplishing those objectives. 
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Foreword 
This statement, prepared by the Committee for Improvement of 
Management in Government, is approved and issued by the Research 
and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development. 
Presidential succession and inability have been of recurring con-
cern to the nation for more than a century. We need clearly determined 
means to transfer the duties and powers of the Presidency quickly, but 
in a legitimate and orderly way, when death or inability of the President 
occurs. Our proposals are directed to that effect. They also provide ways 
for filling any vacancy that may occur in the Vice Presidency. 
Our consideration of these problems was assisted materially by 
the consensus reached by the American Bar Association, and published 
( 1964) in the report, "Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Va-
cancy." We acknowledge, also, the help of Demetrios Carnley of Barnard 
College; John Feerick of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New 
York City; and Vincent Doyle of the Library of Congress. Their knowl-
edge of American history, politics, and constitutional law served the 
Committee well. As consultants, however, they are not responsible for 
our conclusions or recommendations. 
On behalf of the Research and Policy Committee I wish to ex-
press our gratitude to Mr. Marion B. Folsom as Chairman and Mr. John 
A. Perkins as Vice Chairman, and to the members of the Committee for 
Improvement of Management in Government, its advisors and consult-
ants. I also wish to express our appreciation for the financial assistance 
received from the Carnegie Corporation, the Edgar Stern Family Fund, 
and other foundations in making this and additional statements possible. 
Theodore 0. Yntema, Chairman 
Research and Policy Committee 
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1. Introduction 
The office of President of the United States is the toughest and 
most important job in the world. It has a unique concentration of those 
powers and responsibilities that in most other nations are shared by two 
or three top officials. For this reason vacancies, inability, and transitions 
in this office are matters of gravest concern to our country and to the 
world. 
As chief of state, the President symbolizes the sovereignty and 
unity of the American people. As chief executive of the government, 
he is in active charge of the affairs of the national administration. As 
Constitutional commander in chief of the military services, the President 
controls both the nuclear trigger and the use of all other military force. 
As chief initiator and implementer of foreign policy, he is expected to 
mold a world environment in which resort to nuclear weapons will not 
be necessary. 
As the main source of proposals for major legislative action, the 
President's leadership is essential if Congress is to perform its own role 
properly. By custom, the President is responsible for the direction and 
management of his political party. Finally, the President is looked to as 
the all-around national problem-solver, who is expected to head off 
strikes and depressions, assist victims of flood and famine, and move 
immediately with some kind of solution in almost every large-scale emer-
gency or crisis. 
Importance of Smooth Transition 
The President's active leadership is so essential to the effective 
operation of the government that his death or serious illness not only 
constitutes a personal tragedy but creates the risk of national disaster. 
When President Kennedy was assassinated in November of 1963, the 
American people were shocked and grieved by his loss, but, even more 
importantly, they felt grave concern for the safety of the Republic. 
Fortunately, the Presidential powers and duties were quickly 
assumed by a new President who immediately sought to remove public 
anxiety. Less than two hours after President Kennedy's death, Vice Presi-
dent Johnson took the Presidential oath of office. In less than a week, in 
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an address to Congress, President Johnson made clear that the policies 
and programs of his predecessor would be continued under his admin-
istration. 
There are potential situations, however, under which a smooth 
transition would not occur. There is no guarantee that virtually unin-
terrupted exercise of Presidential powers and duties would always be 
repeated. There are serious gaps and ambiguities in the Constitution 
concerning vacancy or inability in the Presidential office. The pertinent 
provision is found in Article II, Section 1. 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his 
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and 
Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice 
President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of 
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President 
and the Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as 
President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Dis-
ability be removed, or a President shall be elected. 
Although this arrangement has served reasonably well on most-
though not all-past occasions, it leaves many open questions. 
Need for Clarification 
The United States has never experienced a case where both Presi-
dential and Vice Presidential offices became vacant within a four-year 
term, and the succession statutes have never been tested. 
More fundamentally, the Constitution is not clear about 
-What actually constitutes inability to discharge the powers and duties 
of the Presidential office; 
-Who determines that such inability exists; 
-Whether, in the event of Presidential inability, it is only the powers 
and duties of the Presidency that devolve on the Vice President, or 
the office itself. 
Despite the urgent need for solution-demonstrated dramatically 
and repeatedly in recent years-neither corrective legislation nor con-
stitutional amendment has been adopted. 
Senate Proposal 
In September of 1964 the Senate approved a proposed constitu-
tional amendment by unanimous vote. It provides for keeping the office 
of Vice President filled , and also deals with the problem of Presidential 
inability. Although the House of Representatives has taken no action on 
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this proposal, Senate approval justifies its careful study. It reads: 
SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from office 
or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become 
President. 
SECTION 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of Vice 
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall 
take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of 
Congress. 
SECTION 3. If the President declares in writing that he is unable 
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and 
duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting Presi-
dent. 
SECTION 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice 
President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the heads 
of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may 
by law provide, transmits to the Congress his written declaration 
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the 
powers and duties of the office as Acting President. 
SECTION 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his 
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the 
powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President, with the 
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive 
departments or such other body as Congress may by law provide, 
transmits within two days to the Congress his written declaration 
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office. Thereupon Congress shall immediately decide the 
issue. If the Congress determines by two-thirds vote of both 
Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge 
the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall re-
sume the powers and duties of his office. 
Criteria for Judgment of Proposals 
This Committee is convinced that the issues of succession and 
inability are vital and must be faced by the nation without further delay. 
We have sought to examine each alternative that has been seriously pro-
posed, and to identify its advantages and disadvantages. 
The Committee recognizes that no solution can be perfect. All 
alternative solutions have gaps. In analyzing the alternatives this Com-
mittee has judged their pros and cons against these basic criteria: 
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Continuity in the Presidential office: 
In event of either death or inability of the President, there must 
be no break in the exercise of the powers and duties of the Presidency; 
Legitimacy: 
Any transfer of the Presidential office or its powers and duties must 
be fully acceptable to government officials and to the general public; 
Certainty: 
No question of doubt should be permitted to arise as to who is 
exercising the powers and duties of the Presidency at any time-two 
men competing for Presidential authority would be disastrous for the 
nation; 
Stability in policy: 
There should be no sharp shift in policy or change of party; 
Speed and simplicity in procedures: 
The procedures by which either the Presidential office or its powers 
and duties are transferred must be fast, efficient, and easily under-
stood; 
Preservation of the separation of powers: 
Whatever corrective action may be taken, it must not weaken our 
traditional pattern of separation of powers, particularly between the 
Presidency and Congress. 
The Committee is convinced that correct solutions must meet all 
these tests. 
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2. Filling Vice Presidential 
Vacancies 
Eight of our 35 Presidents have died in office. 1 On sixteen different 
occasions, totaling more than 37 years, the Vice Presidential office has 
been vacant. Eight Vice Presidents succeeded to the Presidency, seven 
died during their terms of office, and one resigned. It is merely a fortunate 
chance that both Presidential and Vice Presidential offices have never 
been vacant simultaneously during a single four-year elective span.* 
Of the four Presidents immediately preceding Lyndon B. John-
son, Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy did not live out their 
terms; Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered a serious heart attack ; and Harry 
S. Truman was the object of an attempted assassination. These events 
prove the importance of having a potential Presidential successor avail-
able at all times. This person must be fully acquainted with current policy 
in domestic and foreign affairs, and be prepared to assume the Presidency 
on a moment's notice, with its corresponding powers and duties. 
The Presidential successor should be basically sympathetic to the 
plans and aspirations of the incumbent President. Continuity and con-
sistency require that he should not undertake abrupt shifts in governmen-
tal policy. To do so might disrupt public confidence in the aftermath of 
a succession crisis. We conclude that there must always be a full-time 
Vice President intimately associated with the President, if these criteria 
are to be met. 
In line with this view, there has been an increasing tendency for 
Presidents to use their Vice Presidents for a variety of important assign-
ments. Under President Roosevelt, Henry A. Wallace helped run im-
portant war agencies. Alben W. Barkley, President Truman's Vice Presi-
dent, was added as a statutory member of the National Security Council , 
and participated directly in making foreign and military policy decisions. 
Mr. Barkley also served President Truman as a link with Congress. 
Especially after President Eisenhower's first illness, Vice Presi-
dent Richard M. Nixon took on more responsibilities. In the President's 
I See table in the Appendix, p. 36. 
*See Memorandum by MR. WILLIAM BENTON, page 39. 
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several absences he presided over meetings of the Cabinet and the Na-
tional Security Council. Mr. Nixon served as chairman of the Committee 
on Government Contracts and of the Cabinet Committee on Price Sta-
bility and Economic Growth. Representing the President, he also under-
took numerous missions to foreign countries. 
Under President Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson was one of the 
most active Vice Presidents in history. He participated in meetings of 
the Cabinet and the National Security Council. He, too, made extensive 
trips abroad as a Presidential emissary, helping him to become acquainted 
with foreign leaders. Mr. Johnson also served as chairman of the Peace 
Corps Advisory Committee, of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Council and of the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity Em-
ployment. 
1. We recommend that the Consti-
tution be amended to provide for 
filling the Vice Presidential office 
whenever it becomes vacant. 
Alternative Proposals for 
Filling Vice Presidential 
Vacancies 
A number of alternative meth-
ods could be used to fill vacancies 
in the office of Vice President: 
HOW TO AMEND 
To be adopted as part of the Con-
stitution, a proposed amendment 
normally must be approved by a 
two-thirds vote in each House of 
Congress and ratified by three-
fourths of the fifty states. The pro-
vision for calling a constitutional 
convention, with its product to be 
ratified by three-fourths of the 
states, has not yet been used. 
• Selection of a new Vice President in a special election; 
• Selection of a new Vice President by the electoral college; 
• Establishment of a "Second" or "Legislative Vice President" auto-
matically to become the "First" or "Executive Vice President" in case 
of a vacancy; 
• Selection of a new Vice President by Congress; 
• Selection of a new Vice President through nomination by the Presi-
dent with some form of Congressional approval. 
Special Vice Presidential Election. A special election to fill a 
vacancy in the Vice Presidency would appear to have a singular advan-
tage in following an established democratic process. However, an extra 
nationwide election for either the Presidency or Vice Presidency, with 
the campaigning and other interruption of normal governmental pro-
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cesses that it entails, would be highly disruptive. 
An open, interim election might result in a Vice President of a 
different party from the President's, which would weaken the Presidency. 
However, mechanisms for limiting election to members of the President's 
party would be most difficult to devise. 
Selection By the Electoral College. The proposal for having the 
electoral college select a new Vice President would avoid the disruption 
of a special popular election, while still seeming to rely on the regular 
electoral process. But the electoral college does not exist as a single 
body. It must assemble, in segments, in the 50 state capitols and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Its attempted use would lead to selection of a potential 
President by some 538 virtually unknown individuals not realistically 
representative. 
Multiple Vice Presidents. Having two or more Vice Presidents 
would provide greater probability that one would survive to be available 
as a full-time Presidential successor. To divide the limited Vice Presi-
dential powers and duties, just when the importance of the office has 
come to be better recognized, however, might lower the quality of those 
who would seek even a "First Vice Presidency." 
Having two or more Vice Presidencies would place the Presiden-
tial nominee under more pressure to give representation on the national 
ticket to factional, sectional, or ethnic wings within the party. This could 
result in a choice of potential successors unable to work closely with the 
President or with each other.* 
Selection By Congress. Selection of a new Vice President solely 
by Congress has the advantage of appearing closest to a popular choice, 
without the delay and disruption of a special election. 
One major disadvantage of this selection process is the possi-
bility that a Vice President could be chosen with a policy outlook incom-
patible with that of the President. A more serious disadvantage is that 
Congress would acquire a measure of control over the selection of poten-
tial Presidents that it has never had. The traditional American pattern 
of separation of powers would be shifted toward legislative supremacy. 
Congressional Approval After Presidential Nomination. The 
proposal for nomination of a candidate by the President with approval 
by one or both Houses of Congress has strongest general support. The 
restriction of choice to Presidential nominees would insure acceptability 
to the President. Congressional approval would serve as a check, symbol-
izing popular participation and establishing legitimacy. 
*See Memorandum by MR. JOHN F. MERRIAM, page 40. 
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2. We recommend that the Constitution be amended to provide that any 
vacancy in the office of Vice President be filled through nomination by the 
President with approval by Congress.,;, 
This Congressional approval of Presidential nominees to fill va-
cancies in the Vice Presidency might take one of three forms: 
• Confirmation by the Senate alone; 
• Approval by majorities of those present and voting in both Houses 
of Congress acting separately; 
• Approval by a majority of those present and voting at a joint session 
of Congress. 
Proponents of Congressional approval through simple Senatorial 
confirmation argue that, since the Senate confirms all other Presidential 
nominations, it is better equipped by reason of experience, structure, and 
procedures to perform this function. They also point out that the Con-
stitution specifies that, when no Vice Presidential candidate receives a 
majority of electoral votes, the Senate shall select the Vice President 
from the candidates with the two highest numbers of such votes . 
Those who want the House of Representatives to participate, 
either separately or in joint session, argue that this would tend to elevate 
the Vice Presidency above all other executive appointments. Prior ap-
proval by both Houses of Congress would strengthen legitimacy. The 
Senate does not reflect population differences, whereas the Senate and 
House together duplicate the allocation of electoral votes among the 
states. 
For these reasons, the Committee believes the House should par-
ticipate in the confirmation process. Whether the House and Senate 
should act separately or in joint session may be argued. Those who favor 
separate House appr.oval point out that there are no precedents or estab-
lished rules of procedure for Congress to act in joint session. Neither, of 
course, does the House presently confirm any appointments. 
We suggest that rules of procedure could be adopted making ac-
tion in joint session more expeditious than with the two Houses voting 
separately. We are impressed by the fact that a joint session would dupli-
cate electoral vote allocation among the several states. 
3. We recommend that the Constitution he amended to provide for filling 
any vacancy in the office of Vice President through nomination by the Presi-
dent with approval by a majority of Senators and Representatives present and 
voting in a joint session of Congress.* 
'''See Memorandum by MR. JOHN F. MERRIAM, page 40. 
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3. Changing the Line 
of Succession 
If provision is made for keeping the Vice Presidency filled at all 
times, the further line of Presidential succession loses much of its im-
portance. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that both Presidential and Vice 
Presidential offices could become vacant simultaneously. In that case 
some successor would have to take office. 
The framers of the Constitution made provision for this eventu-
ality in Article II, Section 1, which gives Congress authority to 
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, 
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer 
shall then act as President ... 
Congress passed a succession law in 1792, pursuant to this sec-
tion. There was considerable Congressional debate at that time over 
whether the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House are Constitutional "officers" eligible for designation as Presiden-
tial successors under the terms of Article II, Section 1. Nevertheless, they 
were named as the potential successors, in that order. 
The law of 1792 was changed in 1886, placing the heads of the 
several executive departments in 
line of succession directly after the 
Vice President. First in order of 
precedence was the Secretary of 
State. 
Three shortcomings in the 
earlier system led to this change. 
At the time of President Andrew 
Johnson's impeachment, there 
was no Vice President. Hence, 
the Senate could have elevated its 
own presiding officer to the Presi-
dency by convicting the incum-
bent President. No other Presi-
SUCCESSION ORDER 
Under the statute of 1886, the 
succession followed this order : 
Secretary of State, Secretary of 
the ·Treasury, Secretary of War, 
Attorney General, Postmaster Gen-
eral, Secretary of the Navy, and 
Secretary of the Interior. It has been 
suggested that, with War and Navy 
Departments now combined in a 
single department, the Secretary of 
Defense should be brought up to 
second in the line, following the 
Secretary of State. 
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dent has had to face impeachment proceedings, but another serious 
shortcoming has also become evident over the years. Frequently, the 
President pro tempore or the Speaker, or both, have been members of a 
political party opposed to the President's. Parenthetically, during two 
periods of Vice Presidential vacancy-when President James A. Garfield 
died in 1881 and when Vice President Thomas A. Hendricks died in 
1885-there was at the moment neither a Speaker nor a President pro 
tempore. 
The most recent change in the succession law was made in 194 7. 
It placed the Speaker first, followed by the President pro tempore, ahead 
of the Cabinet members in the line of succession. President Truman 
supported this reversion, on the ground that a President should not be 
required to choose his own potential successor in the process of naming 
a Secretary of State. He argued that the Speaker and the President pro 
tempore are elected to their posts by legislative bodies representing all 
the people. This Committee does not concur with this reasoning, nor 
with the present statute based on it. 
The records of the Constitutional Convention, and the language 
of the Constitution itself, cast strong doubt on whether the Speaker and 
the President pro tempore are "officers" eligible for succession to execu-
tive authority as required in the Constitutional sense. Even if this doubt 
were resolved, the requirement that the Speaker-or the President pro 
tempore-must resign his Congressional position before acting as Presi-
dent would force him to sacrifice a long legislative career even for the 
briefest Presidential tour of duty. This objection has special weight in 
cases of temporary Presidential inability, when his powers and duties 
would be assumed by his "successor" for only a limited period of days 
or weeks. 
One strange effect of the present statute is that it gives the House 
of Representatives a possible series of succession choices during a single 
four-year term. This occurs because, after a Speaker had succeeded to 
the Presidency, the House would choose a new Speaker, who would then 
be first in the line of succession. 
However great may have been the personal abilities of incum-
bents who have held these offices, it is clear that their preparation for 
sudden elevation to the Presidency could not approach that of a Vice 
President, nor that of a leading Cabinet member. The demands of their 
important full-time jobs do not permit them to observe and to participate 
in day-to-day Presidential activities, as leading Cabinet officers do. The 
Speaker, for example, functions as chief leader of the majority party in 
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the House, and presides over a 435-member legislative body, in addition 
to performing the duties of a regular Congressman. Exercise of these 
legislative responsibilities requires his undivided attention. 
During eight of the past eighteen years the House of Representa-
tives has been controlled by the party opposing that of the President. 
Hence, succession to the Presidency by the Speaker oftentimes could 
change party control of the entire Executive Branch. 
1. We recommend that the 1886 succession law be restored with the heads 
of executive departments taking their former positions in the line of suc-
cession.~' 
*See Memorandum by MR. JOHN F . MERRIAM, page 40. 
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4. Determining Presidential 
Inability 
Problems concerning Presidential inability pose greater difficul-
ties than vacancies in the Vice Presidency. They arise directly from the 
language of the Constitution. 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his 
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Power and Duties 
of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President ... 
This brief passage raises questions on three important points: 
-In case of Presidential inability, whether the Vice President assumes 
"the powers and duties" of the Presidency or the "office" itself; 
-How commencement of Presidential inability is established; 
-How termination of Presidential inability is decided. 
Devolution of "Office" 
or of "Powers and Duties" 
The Constitution does not distinguish between Presidential "in-
ability" and vacancy in the Presidential office due to "removal," "death," 
or "resignation." In context, there is no ambiguity concerning removal, 
death, or resignation; but "inability" is not defined in the Constitution. 
Congress lacks final authority to define Constitutional terms. Clarifica-
tion, making more specific dispositions concerning exercise of discretion 
in these matters, depends on adoption of a formal amendment. 
The first situation contemplated in this clause of the Constitution 
occurred upon the death of President William Henry Harrison in April, 
1841. Two days later, Vice President John Tyler took the oath of 
office as "President of the United States." A few newspapers-and some 
members of Congress-objected to Tyler's assumption of the Presidency, 
arguing that he was still only "Acting President." The objection was dis-
missed a few weeks later, when Congress overwhelmingly approved a 
resolution appointing a committee to wait on "the President of the United 
States" and to inform him that a quorum of the two Houses had assem-
bled in special session. 
The precedent set with Tyler has been confirmed seven times. 
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Upon the death of their predecessors, few questioned that Millard Fill-
more, Andrew Johnson, Chester A. Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin 
Coolidge, Harry S. Truman, or Lyndon B. Johnson had actually become 
President. This custom has served well, because the person permanently 
exercising Presidential powers and duties needs to hold the full dignity 
and prestige of the Presidential office. It is now the established rule of 
succession that when a President dies the Vice President becomes 
President. 
Beneficial as this custom has been, it has had unexpected and 
unfortunate collateral effects. The Constitution does not distinguish 
between Presidential vacancy and inability, and it has been possible to 
claim that in the case of temporary Presidential inability the Vice Presi-
dent would assume not only the powers and duties of the office but the 
permanent office of President. President Garfield, shot by an assassin 
in 1881, did not die until 80 days later. Vice President Arthur refused 
to exercise the Presidential powers and duties, largely because both he 
and the Cabinet feared that by so doing he might displace Garfield 
permanently as President. 
During the eight days President William McKinley lived after he 
was shot in 1901, governmental business came to a standstill. Another 
-far more prolonged-period of Presidential inability occurred when 
Woodrow Wilson suffered a stroke paralyzing his left side. For most of 
the eighteen months while the President was seriously ill, his wife, his 
personal physician, and the Cabinet struggled to conduct the affairs of 
state. Mrs. Wilson largely determined what papers the President might 
see, to whom he might talk, and for how long. 
President Wilson did not meet with his Cabinet for eight months; 
he allowed 28 bills to become law by failure to act within the requisite 
ten days; and he did not even receive new foreign ambassadors, as re-
quired by the Constitution. Most important, at certain critical times in 
the negotiations, the President's physician refused to let Senate leaders 
of his own party talk to him about a possible compromise of issues in-
volving the Versailles Treaty, which if accepted by opposing groups 
might have led to its ratification. 
As in President Arthur's case, Vice President Thomas R. Mar-
shall refused to exercise the President's "powers and duties." When the 
possibility was raised, President Wilson's White House advisers-and 
the Cabinet-refused to declare him disabled, fearing that Wilson would 
be permanently displaced. 
The exercise of Presidential powers and duties was suspended 
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again-this time briefly-during President Harding's fatal illness. Still, no 
corrective measures were adopted, either statutory or amendatory. 
The most recent instances of extended Presidential inability ·oc-
curred in the Eisenhower administration. In September, 1955, President 
Eisenhower suffered a "moderate" coronary thrombosis, hospitalizing 
him for six weeks. The President was practically incommunicado for the 
first week, and only gradually resumed normal Presidential powers and 
duties. He attended no Cabinet meeting for two months after his attack. 
During this period Vice President Nixon did not exercise Presi-
dential powers and duties. The most important administrative decisions 
were made by Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams, by other members 
of the White House staff, and by members of the Cabinet. Fortunately, 
since Congress was not in session, no bills awaited signature. Even more 
fortunately, no major foreign or domestic emergencies developed. 
In June of 1956, President Eisenhower suffered an ileitis attack 
and underwent an emergency operation. Again, he was hospitalized, this 
time for three weeks, but he was soon able to perform most of his duties. 
In November of 1957, President Eisenhower suffered a mild stroke which 
briefly impaired his speech. 
Three months after his last illness President Eisenhower made 
public the text of an informal agreement with Vice President Nixon 
concerning the problem of Presidential inability. Dated March 3, 1958, 
it stated: 
1. In the event of inability the President would-if possible-so 
inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as 
acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the office un-
til the inability had ended. 
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the President 
from so communicating with the Vice President, the Vice Presi-
dent, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under 
the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the pow-
ers and duties of the office and would serve as acting President 
until the inability had ended. 
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the in-
ability had ended and at that time would resume the full exercise 
of the powers and duties of the office. 
In August of 1961, President Kennedy announced an identical 
agreement between himself and Vice President Johnson. In December 
of 1963, it was announced that President Johnson and House Speaker 
John W. McCormack, then first in line to succeed to the Presidency, 
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had agreed upon the same formula. 
These informal agreements are a significant advance, but uncer-
tainty persists about who may be in charge of the government under 
certain circumstances. It is our view that any uncertainty in this matter 
is intolerable and must be resolved. The existence of nuclear weapons 
requires that there be a chief executive with clear authority to act at all 
times. Even the briefest delay in activating defense or retaliatory forces 
in a crisis could lead to national disaster. 
When it was revealed, in the fall of 1962, that missile emplace-
ments were being built in Cuba, prompt action had to be taken. Inaction 
would have resulted in a drastic and possibly irreversible shift in the 
balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Once 
again, when our destroyers were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin in the 
summer of 1964, a decision on retaliation had to be taken almost in-
stantaneously. Only the President, or an official who is clearly authorized 
to act as President, can make such a decision. 
Even in less crisis-laden domestic matters, many built-in deadlines 
require immediate Presidential decision. When Congress is in session, 
Presidential inaction on bills passed by Congress automatically makes 
them laws. Once Congress adjourns, Presidential inaction automatically 
kills bills by "pocket veto." 
Annual budgets have to be submitted to Congress by certain cal-
endar deadlines, and only the President can do so. Moreover, inability 
of the President may force other officials to determine matters within 
the President's prerogatives, and this in turn may cause conflicts among 
officials of the Executive Branch. Unquestioned Presidential authority 
is essential if the government is to function properly. 
In the Garfield and Wilson illnesses, inaction by the Vice Presi-
dents can be traced partly to their feeling that exercising Presidential 
powers might permanently displace temporarily incapacitated Presi-
dents. Although the Eisenhower-Nixon, Kennedy-Johnson, and Johnson-
McCormack agreements recognize the temporary nature of any devolu-
tion of Presidential powers because of inability, the Constitution itself 
should be clarified on this point. 
1. We recommend that the Constitution be amended to require that in case 
of Presidential inability the Vice President shall act as President, assuming 
full Presidential powers and duties during the period of inability. 
There is a two-fold problem in establishing Presidential inability. 
First, what constitutes an inability requiring devolution of Presidential 
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powers and duties to the Vice President or other officer in line of suc-
cession? Second, how is the beginning of such an inability to be deter-
mined? 
The Meaning of "Inability" 
Records of the Constitutional Convention give no evidence about 
what kinds of situations the framers intended to cover by the terms "in-
ability" and "disability." The first extended discussion of the meaning 
of the term "inability" took place during President Garfield's illness. 
One point of view was that the "inability" recognized by the Con-
stitution was a mental or intellectual incapacity such as insanity. Others 
held that "inability" exists whenever the President is in fact unable to 
exercise his powers, whatever the cause. 
An additional distinction has been made between "temporary" 
and "permanent" inability. It has been argued that temporary inability 
does not justify the exercise of Presidential powers by the Vice President, 
whereas permanent inability does. This distinction was considered espe-
cially important by those who assumed that an Acting Vice President 
would succeed to the "office" of President, permanently displacing the 
incumbent. 
2. We recommend that the term Presidential "inability" be left undefined 
in the Constitution, and that it continue to be understood to mean any situa-
tion in which the President is unable to exercise the powers and duties of his 
office. 
Acceptance of this meaning of "inability" should facilitate the 
continuous exercise of Presidential powers and duties. The controlling 
criteria then become the President's condition and the contingencies 
he must meet. Thus, in time of crisis or war even a brief illness would 
constitute inability. In an extended period of peace and tranquility a 
more prolonged illness might not be disabling. 
Whether the cause of the inability be mental or physical is im-
material. It is equally irrelevant whether the President will or will not 
recover his full capacities; continuous, uninterrupted exercise of Presi-
dential powers should not depend on anyone's ability as a prophet. 
We believe that any attempt to define or to amplify the meaning 
of the term "inability" in the Constitution could be undesirably restric-
tive. It might provide a basis for new arguments about whether some 
particular kind of incapacity (for example, a President being held hos-
tage while abroad) is included. 
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Alternative Methods for Determining Inability 
No one has ever seriously questioned the right of the President to 
declare his own inability and request the Vice President to exercise the 
Presidential powers and duties until the inability ceases. When it is uni-
versally recognized that only the Presidential powers and duties-not 
the office-devolve in the case of inability, the President will be less 
reluctant to admit that he is temporarily unable to perform his responsi-
bilities effectively. 
The situation is more serious when the President is either unable 
or unwilling to declare his inability. In the absence of a Presidential 
declaration, who is to decide whether a President suffers such "inability" 
to perform his powers and duties that they should be exercised by the 
Vice President-or the person next in line of succession? There have been 
several widely suggested arrangements, some of which would require 
Constitutional amendment, among them: 
The Vice President declares the President's inability ( a ) on his own 
authority, or ( b) with the concurrence of some other special constitu-
tional or statutory tribunal; 
The Cabinet declares the President's inability on its own authority. 
The Vice President on His Own Authority . Most Constitutional 
authorities agree that, under present language, the Vice President has 
the right to declare the President's inability if the latter should be in-
capable or unwilling to do so himself. Since Article II, Section 1, imposes 
on the Vice President the duty to act as President in such case, he alone 
is presumed to be the judge of the facts. 
The seeming advantage of this interpretation is that determina-
tion of inability may be made simply, quickly, and clearly. Although it 
has never been used, this position could be established beyond question 
by amending the Constitution to specify the Vice President's sole right 
to decide Presidential inability. This places the decision in the hands of 
a visible public official responsible to a nationwide electorate. 
A disadvantage of placing the decision solely with the Vice Presi-
dent lies in a conceivable usurpation of Presidential powers and duties 
by an unscrupulous Vice President. Needless to say, such an eventuality 
has never occurred. On the other hand, as borne out by past experience, 
the Vice President may refuse to assume Presidential powers and duties 
in order to avoid any appearance of self-seeking or usurpation. 
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Special Tribunal. Another proposed method for establishing Pres-
idential inability is to place responsibility for the decision on some special 
tribunal, empowered to act either on its own or the Vice President's 
initiative. The advantages offered for such a tribunal are its apparent 
detachment and its great prestige - hopefully causing its decisions to be 
accepted without challenge. The disadvantages include its lack of 
political responsibility, the possibility of a split decision weakening its 
acceptability, and the inherent delay in reaching a decision because of a 
probable need for holding extensive hearings. 
The Cabinet on Its Own Authority. Despite the weight of the 
argument for the Vice President's legal authority to determine the Presi-
dent's inability and to assume the Presidential powers and duties on his 
own discretion, no Vice President has ever acted accordingly. An in-
stant capability for replacement of a disabled President has merit - in 
light of existing nuclear armaments - but historical precedents as well 
as our more normal expectations of future situations both suggest a 
different atmosphere in which action is more likely to be required. On 
this subject, the late President Hoover has said: 
In my view, the determination of inability and its termination 
should rest with the Cabinet, and the executive powers should be 
executed by the Vice President during any such period. 
My reasons for this view are as follows: 
1. The Cabinet (members) are in intimate contact with the 
President during any illness. 
2. They can appraise the national setting as to whether there 
is any emergency which requires any action beyond the 
President's abilities. 
Since the Cabinet1 is in a position to obtain firsthand informa-
tion about the President's medical condition more quickly than any 
other group, it could act with dispatch. Because its members are ap-
pointed by the President - with the advice and consent of the Senate -
it would not be inclined to exercise such power except in a proper case. 
If given Constitutional sanction the Cabinet's decision would most likely 
meet with public acceptance. Thus, the legitimacy of the Acting Presi-
dent would be fully recognized. 
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This proposal would overcome the serious problem of Vice Presi-
1 As used here, and throughout this discussion, the "Cabinet" refers to the heads of the 
executive departments, now ten in number. Others attending Cabinet meetings-e.g., 
the Ambassador to the U.N.-would have no vote. 
dential reluctance to assume the Presidential powers and duties, even 
when evident Presidential inability has extended over a long period of 
time, as in the Garfield and Wilson cases. Legal authority for the 
Cabinet to decide inability would absolve the Vice President of any 
accusation of usurpation of power. At the same time, the possibility of 
attempted usurpation by the Vice President would be eliminated. 
The problems facing a Vice President called upon to assume the 
powers and duties of the Presidency - with an elected President still 
living - are so great and far-reaching that every effort should be made 
to ease his burden. Placing responsibility for accession upon the trusted 
political associates of the President would strengthen the Vice Presi-
dential hand in a delicate and difficult situation. 
Since the Cabinet might be factionalized, it has been said that 
giving the Cabinet a decisive role in this area would be dangerous. This 
is not in harmony with historical experience. It was the Cabinet - its 
members working in harmony - that administered the government 
during the Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower inabilities. The Cabinet 
was a stabilizing factor in each of the eight transitions when Vice 
Presidents were elevated to the Presidency. 
Both the Garfield and Wilson Cabinets felt that there was need 
for an Acting President. Lack of Constitutional authority for the Cabinet 
to decide the issue and Constitutional ambiguity concerning the role of 
the Vice President prevented them from taking the action they believed 
to be in the national interest. Given authority through Constitutional 
clarification, it seems certain that these Cabinets would have declared 
their Presidents disabled. 
An argument against Cabinet authority to declare a President 
disabled is that this would affect the power relationship between its 
members and the President. It is hard to see, however, how this would 
affect the President's relationship with his Cabinet any more than the 
impeachment power affects the Presidential relationship with Congress. 
If part of the Cabinet were to act in such a manner as to disrupt the 
relationship, the President could replace those out of sympathy with him. 
The concern that the Cabinet might not be unanimous - indeed 
that it might be closely divided - adds weight to the need for its official 
judgment. To understand the importance of concurrence by the Cabinet 
we must conceive of a situation where the Vice President might try to 
assert his authority against the objections of a majority of the Cabinet. 
The resulting confusion and discord would present a threat to national 
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security - perhaps a greater threat than that caused by temporary 
Presidential disability without the assumption of his powers and duties 
by anyone. 
This leads to another point. With the decisive role given to the 
Cabinet, the President would be less reluctant to declare his own in-
ability. Conversely, if some other body were to have the power, the 
President might fear that it would tend to disagree with him when he 
declared the end of his inability. 
Time permitting, the Cabinet might wish to seek the best avail-
able advice from whatever quarter. The late President Hoover suggested 
this to the Senate Standing Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments 
in January of 1958. 
All of which leads me to the generalization that a President's in-
ability to serve or his possible restoration to office should be deter-
mined by the leading officials in the executive branch, as they are 
of the party having the responsibilities determined by the election. 
I believe that a simple amendment to the Constitution (or possibly 
statutory law) could provide for a commission made up from the 
executive branch to make the determinations required. I do not 
suggest that the individual persons be named but that the depart-
ments or agencies be enumerated, whose chief official or head 
should be a member of such a commission. The number could 
well be limited to not less than 7 and not more than 15 such heads 
of departments or agencies. There could be a further provision 
that they should seek the advice of a panel of experienced phys-
icians or surgeons. 
I cannot conceive of any circumstance when such a defined body 
of leaders from the executive branch would act in these circum-
stances otherwise than in the national interest. 
To implement Cabinet authority any member or the Vice Presi-
dent, if he desires, could be empowered to initiate discussion of an 
issue concerning inability. A majority Cabinet vote would be required 
to decide the question. We believe that concurrence in a Cabinet finding 
that inability exists by the Vice President is desirable, since he is to 
bear the burdens of the office. Further, he is our only other nationally 
elected official, and his concurrence would strengthen public acceptance 
of the Cabinet's judgment. Joint action would provide maximum evi-
dence of legitimacy. 
It is conceivable that an emergency situation could arise re-
quiring some Presidential action before the Cabinet is able to meet or 
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to otherwise determine whether Presidential inability exists. Because it 
is imperative that someone have power to act as President at all times 
the Vice President, in such a case, may have to assume responsibility on 
his own accord. Modern communications greatly diminish the prob-
ability of this necessity. In such event the Cabinet should then decide 
expeditiously whether Presidential inability requires the Vice President 
to continue to act as President. 
3. We recommend that the beginning of Presidential inability he deter-
mined by a majority vote of the Cabinet, the Vice President concurring, and 
that discussions leading to such vote may he initiated by the Vice President or 
any member of the Cabinet.* 
*See Memoranda by M R. JOHN F. M E RRIAM and by MR. c . WREDE PETERS M EYER, page 40. 
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5. Terminating Inability 
Once the President's inability is determined, the Vice President 
assumes the Presidential powers and duties. The next crucial problem 
involves the method of determining when the inability ends, so that the 
President may resume the functions of his office. 
Alternative Methods for Terminating Inability 
The following are the most seriously considered alternatives for 
placing authority to determine the end of a Presidential inability: 
-The President alone decides; 
- The President and the Vice President must agree, or in the event of 
disagreement either (a) the Vice President's decision is final or (b) 
the President's view prevails unless opposed by the Cabinet and at 
least two-thirds of both Houses of Congress; 
- The devolution of Presidential powers and duties is permanent and 
irrevocable; 
-The Cabinet decides the issue by majority vote. 
The President Determines End of His Inability. One simple 
method of establishing termination of Presidential inability is to allow 
the President to do so by his own declaration. A responsible President, 
not mentally deranged or otherwise detached from reality, should know 
when he is able to exercise his powers and responsibilities. Final author-
ity in the President places it beyond question who is exercising the 
Presidential powers at any time. The disadvantage is that the President 
may take back his powers and duties when, in reality, he cannot exercise 
them effectively. 
The President and Vice President Jointly Determine End of 
Inability. Few would question seriously the right of the President to 
resume his powers and duties when the Vice President also agrees that 
he is able to do so. But, if the determination is placed in their hands, 
what happens when the President and Vice President disagree? For all 
practical purposes, the problem is the same whether raised while the 
President is still exercising his office or when attempting to recapture 
its powers and duties. 
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The proposed amendment approved by the Senate in 1964 pro-
vides that, if the President and Vice President disagree on termination 
of inability, the Vice President could retain the Presidential powers if 
supported by a majority of the Cabinet. The matter would then be 
immediately referred to Congress for a final decision, but, in the interim, 
the Vice President would act as President. It would take a two-thirds 
vote of each House to prevent the President from resuming his powers 
and duties. Such a high degree of unanimity would protect the President 
against possible usurpation. A decision supported by the Vice President, 
a majority of the Cabinet, and two-thirds of the members in both Houses 
of Congress would have the weight of legitimacy and acceptability. 
A disadvantage of the Senate-approved arrangement is that it 
goes too far in protecting the President. By requiring such a high degree 
of unanimity to keep the President from exercising his powers, there 
would be great pressure to accede to the President's self-evaluation of 
his abilities without public challenge. 
A more serious disadvantage is that by making Congress the 
body with ultimate authority to resolve any disagreement beween the 
President and Vice President, a change with possibly grave and un-
predictable consequences would be made in the traditional distribution 
of power between the Legislative and Executive Branches. The Constitu-
tional Convention gave Congress authority to displace the President 
only through the impeachment process. If this additional authority were 
given to a Congress with a hostile two-thirds majority, such as existed 
during the Presidency of Andrew Johnson, it could be used to deprive 
the President of his powers and duties without resorting to the carefully 
circumscribed impeachment procedure. 
But the worst aspect of the Senate proposal is that, while Con-
gress would be debating and deciding the issue, there could be two 
persons both attempting to exercise the powers and duties of the Presi-
dency. Such a situation might lead to disastrous consequences, perhaps 
as severe as if the country had no one to act as President. There must 
always be someone to exercise the powers and duties of the Presidency, 
but there must never be two. 
The Vice President's Decision ls Binding. A different method 
for dealing with disagreement is to make the Vice President's determina-
tion final. The major advantages and disadvantages of this arrangement 
are substantially those associated with allowing the Vice President to 
make the decision on the beginning of Presidential inability. Because 
the procedure is simple, fast, and completely clear, there would be no 
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ambiguity about who is rightfully exercising the Presidential powers 
and duties. But if the Vice President were given the ultimate authority 
on the question, he might be tempted to withhold the Presidential 
powers and duties from a President who has in fact recovered. 
Devolution is Irrevocable. A narrowly held view proposes that, 
once the powers and duties of the President devolve on the Vice Presi-
dent, they should never be returned. The presumable advantage here is 
that the Vice President would be encouraged to exercise the Presidential 
powers and duties to the fullest extent without concern for what might 
happen after the President recovers. 
But the concept of permament devolution of Presidential powers 
and duties - to protect the Vice President - could result in Presidential 
refusal to admit inability, however serious it might actually be. Under 
such circumstances the President would probably challenge any attempt 
by the Vice President or a special tribunal to establish inability. 
Cabinet Decision By Majority Vote . Another alternative would 
place responsibility for deciding when Presidential inability has ceased 
in the hands of the Cabinet. The same considerations governing the 
establishment of disability would apply to its termination. In both in-
stances, for example, the Cabinet is most likely to be intimately aware 
of the facts concerning the President's health. The Cabinet is in a posi-
tion to act quickly and with minimal loss of public confidence. Since 
the President appoints the Cabinet, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, its members would normally wish to restore to him the 
powers and duties of the Presidency as soon as practicable. 
A compelling argument for placing final authority with the Cab-
inet is that it would avoid the possibility of two persons attempting to 
exercise the powers and duties of the President simultaneously. If the 
Cabinet had responsibility for reaching a decision, the Vice President 
would continue as Acting President until the Cabinet decided otherwise. 
The powers and duties of the Presidency must be placed squarely on one 
individual at all times - an objective not satisfactorily achieved by the 
proposed Senate Amendment. 
In the unlikely event that an unscrupulous Vice President should 
seek to keep his hold on the Presidential office in the face of a Presi-
dential claim of recovery, he would have to obtain support from a 
majority of the Cabinet. Moreover, the Congress could, in due time, use 
the impeachment process against him and the members of the Cabinet 
if the justification were clear. Impeachment is more appropriate in deal-
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ing with potential usurpation than the method proposed in the Senate 
Amendment. The Constitutional provisions dealing with impeachment 
imply that the person acting as President (be he President or Vice 
President) continues to exercise the powers and duties of the office 
until Congress has decided the issue. 
In light of these considerations, we regard this as the preferable 
alternative. On the same reasoning that led us to recommend Vice 
Presidential concurrence in a Cabinet finding that Presidential inability 
exists - on the ground that the person to bear the burden of the powers 
and duties should agree to assume them - restoration of his powers 
and duties should be clearly acceptable to the President. 
I. We recommend that the ending of Presidential inability he determined 
by a majority vote of the Cabinet, the President concurring, and that dis-
cussions leading to such vote may be initiated by the President or any member 
of the Cabinet.* 
*See Memorandum by MR. JOHN F . M ERRIAM , page 41. 
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6. Conclusions 
The urgency of national action to resolve the doubts and un-
certainties clouding Presidential succession and inability cannot be 
overly stressed. Failure to correct the deficiencies will subject the nation 
to risks and hazards that are avoidable. Prompt action is imperative 
This Committee has carefully measured the various alternatives 
for solution against certain criteria - continuity, legitimacy, certainty, 
stability, speed, simplicity, and preservation of the separation of powers 
fundamental to our Constitutional system. 
The United States of America must have one person wielding the 
powers and duties of the Presidency at all times. Conversely, it cannot 
tolerate any period of confusion in which two men compete for the 
exercise of Presidential authority. 
Our first major recommendation, therefore, is that the Consti-
tution be amended to provide that any vacancy in the office of Vice 
President be filled. We suggest giving the President authority to nomin-
ate a Vice President, subject to approval by joint session of Congress. 
Those persons in line of succession after the Vice President must 
be familiar with day-to-day Presidential activities. No other officers can 
match the preparation of the Vice President and leading Cabinet mem-
bers for sudden elevation to the Presidency. This Committee, therefore, 
recommends that the line of succession beyond the Vice President be 
revised, placing the chief Cabinet officers next in line, as under the 
statute of 1886. 
We recognize that solution of the problem of Presidential "in-
ability" poses problems, but there is one point on which accepted inter-
pretations of the present Constitution should remain unchallenged. The 
word "inability" should continue to .be understood to include every 
situation where the President, for whatever reason, is unable to exercise 
the powers and duties of his office. The preponderance of legal authority 
now holds that the President would retain his title and "office" in case of 
an established disability, while the Vice President (or whoever may be 
first in line of succession) would automatically assume his powers and 
duties. Clear language on this should be placed in the Constitution. 
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We would not change these basic concepts as applicable to situa-
tions where the President, recognizing his own inability, calls upon the 
Vice President to exercise the Presidential powers and duties. Similarly, 
they apply to those situations where the President is unable to com-
municate his own obvious inability and where there may be need for 
instantaneous action in the national interest. Beyond these situations, 
however, there is need for clarification. 
This Committee's second major recommendation is that author-
ity to decide that Presidential inability exists should be placed in the 
hands of the Cabinet, in consultation with the Vice President or other 
successor. Any such decision should be by majority vote of the Cabinet, 
the Vice President concurring, upon the initiative of any member or of 
the Vice President. Termination of Presidential inability would follow 
the same procedure, except that Presidential-rather than Vice Presi-
dential-concurrence would be required. This proposal would also re-
quire Constitutional revision; but a single amendment might include this 
provision with the other changes recommended. 
When these two major proposals are adopted, the United States 
will always have one person - and only one person - exercising the 
powers and duties of the Presidency. 
We regard these as the best choices among all proposed alterna-
tives. We concede that some variations on these solutions would 
improve our present situation; but we are confident that no other altera-
tions would meet the nation's basic needs as well.* 







John C. Calhoun 
John Tyler 
Millard Fillmore 





Died Apr. 20, 1812 
Died Nov. 23, 1814 
Resigned Dec. 28, 
1832, to take seat 
in Senate 
Took oath of office 
as President, 
Apr. 6, 1841 
Took oath of office 
as President, 
July 10, 1850 
Died Apr. 18, 1853 
Took oath of office 
as President, 
Apr. 15, 1865 
Died Nov. 22, 1875 
Instances when the United States 
has been without a Vice President 
Term for which Length of time 
elected office vacant Yrs. Mos. Day President 
Mar. 4, 1809 - Apr. 20, 1812 - 0 10 12 James Madison 
Mar. 3, 1813 Mar. 3, 1813 
Mar. 4, 1813 - Nov. 23 , 1814 - 2 3 9 Ditto 
Mar. 3, 1817 Mar. 3, 1817 
Mar. 4. 1829 - Dec. 28, 1832 - 0 2 4 Andrew Jackson 
Mar. 3, 1833 Mar. 3, 1833 
Mar. 4, 1841 - Apr. 6, 1841 - 3 11 0 William H. Harrison, died 
Mar. 3, 1845 Mar. 3, 1845 Apr. 4, 1841 
Mar. 5, 1849 - July 10, 1850 - 2 7 23 Zachary Taylor, died 
Mar. 3, 1853 Mar. 3, 1853 July 9, 1850 
Mar. 4, 1853 - Apr. 18, 1853 - 3 10 14 Franklin Pierce 
Mar. 3, 1857 Mar. 3, 1857 
Mar. 4, 1865 - Apr. 15, 1865 - 3 10 17 Abraham Lincoln, died 
Mar. 3, 1869 Mar. 3, 1869 Apr. 15, 1865 
Mar. 4, 1873 - Nov. 22, 1875 - 1 3 10 Ulysses S. Grant 
Mar. 3, 1877 Mar. 3, 1877 
w 
-....! 
Chester A. Arthur Took oath of office Mar. 4, 1881 - Sept. 20, 1881 -
as President, Mar. 3, 1885 Mar. 3, 1885 
Sept. 20, 1881 
Thomas A. Hendricks Died Nov. 25, 1885 Mar. 4, 1885 - Nov. 25, 1885 -
Mar. 3, 1889 Mar. 3, 1889 
Garret A. Hobart Died Nov. 21, 1899 Mar. 4, 1897 - Nov. 21, 1899 -
Mar. 3, 1901 Mar. 3, 1901 
Theodore Roosevelt Took oath of office Mar. 4, 1901 - Sept. 14, 1901 -
as President, Mar. 3, 1905 Mar. 3, 1905 
Sept. 14, 1901 
James S. Sherman Died Oct. 30, 1912 Mar. 4, 1909 - Oct. 30, 1912 -
Mar. 3, 1913 Mar. 3, 1913 
Calvin Coolidge Took oath of office Mar. 4, 1921 - Aug. 3, 1923 -
as President, Mar. 3, 1925 Mar. 3, 1925 
Aug. 3, 1923 
Harry S. Truman Took oath of office Jan. 20, 1945 - Apr. 12, 1945 -
as President, Jan. 20, 1949 Jan. 20, 1949 
Apr. 12, 1945 
Lyndon B. Johnson Took oath of office Jan. 20, 1961 - Nov. 22, 1963 -
as President, Jan. 20, 1965 Jan. 20, 1965 
Nov. 22, 1963 
Total Period of Vacancy 
Source: Adapted from Table Prepared by History and General 
Research Division, Library of Congress 
3 5 13 James A. Garfield, died 
Sept. 19, 18 81 
3 3 7 Grover Cleveland 
1 3 11 William McKinley 
3 5 18 William McKinley, died 
Sept. 14, 1901 
0 4 5 William H. Taft 
1 7 2 Warren G. Harding, died 
Aug. 2, 1923 
3 9 8 Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
died Apr. 12, 1945 
1 1 29 John F. Kennedy, died 
Nov. 22, 1963 
37 3 12 
Occasions on which the President and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives or the President Pro Tempore of the Senate 
were of opposite parties, 1864-1964 
44th Cong. 1875-77 
45th Cong. 1877-79 
46th Cong. 1879-81 
48th Cong. 1883-85 
49th Cong. 1885-87 
50th Cong. 1887-89 
52n<l Cong. 1891-93 
54th Cong. 1895-97 
62nd Cong. 1911-13 
66th Cong. 191 9-21 
72nd Cong. 1931-33 
30th Cong. 194 7-49 
R4th Cong. 1955-57 
85th Cong. 1957-59 
86th Cong. 1959-61 
President and Party 
Ulysses S. Grant - R 
Rutherford B. Hayes-R 
Rutherford B. Hayes-R 
Chester A. Arthur - R 
Grover Cleveland - D 
Grover Cleveland - D 
Benjamin Harrison - R 
Grover Cleveland - D 
William H. Taft-R 
Woodrow Wilson - D 
Herbert C. Hoover - R 
Harry S. Truman - D 
Dwight D. Eisenhower - R 
Dwight D. Eisenhower - R 
Dwight D. Eisenhower - R 
Speaker and Party 
Michael C. Kerr - D 
Samuel J. Randall - D 
Samuel J. Randall - D 
Samuel J. Randall - D 
John G. Carlisle - D 
John G. Carlisle - D 
John G. Carlisle - D 
Charles F. Crisp - D 
Thomas B. Reed - R 
Champ Clark - D 
Frederick H. Gillett - R 
John Nance Garner - D 
Joseph Martin, Jr. - R 
Sam Rayburn - D 
Sam Rayburn - D 
Sam Rayburn - D 
Soiin:c: F11cydop11C'diu Uritannirn. Compiled from Hiowaphical Directory of the 
A 111airn11 Co11,r.,·rc.1.\. 1774-1961. 
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President Pro 
Tempore and Party 
Thomas W. Ferry - R 
Thomas W. Ferry - R 
Allen G. Thurman - D 
George F. Edmunds - R 
John Sherman - R 
John J. Ingalls - R 
Charles F. Manderson - R 
William P. Frye - R 
William P. Frye - R 
Charles Curtis - R 
Augustus 0. Bacon - R 
Jacob H. Gallinger - R 
Henry Cabot Lodge - R 
Frank B. Brandegee - R 
Albert B. Cummins - R 
George H. Moses - R 
Arthur Vandenberg - R 
Walter F. George - D 
Carl Hayden - D 
Carl Hayden - D 
Memoranda of Comment, Reservation or Dissent 
Page I 3-By WILLIAM BENTON: 
1 regret that the Committee has not weighed the possibility of abolishing the 
Vice Presidency altogether. Some of the framers of the Constitution, I am told, 
shared my views. Some felt that special elections should be held in case of presidential 
vacancies; any Vice President was merely to be a caretaker until a special election 
could be held. ( l would add that another officer of the government. such as the 
Speaker of the House, who is always an experienced politician. could serve equally 
well as the interim caretaker.) 
The Committee has not explicitly considered the pros and cons of abolishing the 
Vice Presidency. Its principal "con", according to this report, is this: "An extra 
nationwide election with the campaigning and other interruption of the normal gov-
ernmental process that it entails, particularly coming most of the time after a Presi-
dent's death, is much too disruptive for the benefits to he gained ." This argument 
seems to me very weak. Why should a special election for the Presidency he any more 
disruptive than a regular election? Indeed , the reverse might be true. An election 
after the death of a President might he conducted in a more sober way - and in a 
shorter period - than is ordinarily the case - and that would be all to the good. 
Further. why shouldn't an election after a President's death or disability be for a full 
four-year term, and not merely for the balance of an unfilled term? Thus the word 
"extra" is misleading. There's nothing sacrosanct about the present rhythm. Any 
four-year rhythm on the even years would have the same impact ; the even years 
maintain the identity of the presidential election with the Congressional elections. 
However. there may be good arguments for holding the election within 90 days or 
for the odd years, separating the two . 
What are the benefits of abolishing the Vice Presidency? One of the standards set 
forth for evaluating proposals on presidential succession is "legitimacy of title." Surely 
a person elected President in his own right has a legitimacy no other person can have. 
Effective presidential leadership may sufTcr by the limited mandate even a man of high 
caliber may enjoy as a successor President rather than as an elected President. Even 
more limiting and dangerous is the succession of a mediocre Vice President. Need we 
risk Mr. Throttlcbottom? 
In thi s century - but not in the 19th - the U. S. has been lucky . Theodore 
Rooseve lt , Harry Truman and L yndon Johnson were gifts of fortune rather than 
careful , deliberate choices. lronicall y enough, Teddy Roosevelt was singled out for 
the Vice Presidency not because his talents were esteemed but because they were 
feared . Boss Platt maneuvered him into the Vice Presidency in 1900 in order to 
prevent his re-election as Governor of New York - and to bring his booming political 
career to a dead end. Harry Truman went to the 1944 Convention as campaign 
manager for James Byrnes. 
Thus too often vice presidential nominees arc chosen in a careless or arbitrary 
manner, often to "balance the ticket.'' Nixon was picked in a smoke-filled room 
becau se it was felt a veteran from California - with an anti-communist record to 
embarrass Truman - would strengthen the ticket; Sparkman was chosen by a smaller 
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group in a smaller room to assuage the South; Wallace to butter up the west and the 
farmers. 
Within the terms which the Committee set for itself - that of rationalizing and 
improving present practices - J concur with its recommendations. I am sorry, 
however, that the Committee did not seize its opportunity to analyze more deeply 
the political as well as Constitutional problems and ambiguities surrounding the presi-
dential succession. Modest, pragmatic solutions are not always the best. 
I am not sure a constitutional amendment would be required to meet my 
objective. J have no strong objection to the existence of a Vice Presidency, if it is 
understood that the incumbent would act as President for an interim period only. 
Indeed, there arc reasonable arguments for two vice presidents. My principal ob-
jective is the consideration of the advisability of the special election. 
Page 15-By JOHN F. MERRIAM: 
I strongly favor amending the Constitution to provide for a second Vice Presi-
dent to be elected. This would eliminate almost all of the uncertainties involved when 
the first Vice President succeeds to the Presidency. It is absurd to say that there is 
not enough work for two Vice Presidents of stature when the policy statement states 
at the beginning that the Presidency is the toughest job in the world. 
Page 16-By JoHN F. MERRIAM: 
I believe that approval should be by the Senate only. This is a regular and 
publicly accepted method of approval of Presidential appointments for which estab-
lished procedures exist. Cabinet members' appointments are not approved by both 
Houses, yet they are proposed to be included in the Presidential succession pattern. 
(This also applies to recommendation 3 on same page.) 
Page 19-By JOHN F. MERRIAM: 
I agree except that the order of succession by Cabinet heads should be reviewed 
in the light of present circumstances. 
Par;e 29-By JoHN F. M ERRIAM: 
J strongly disagree. The question of "inability" is one of fact or law, or both. It 
is essential that it not be a political matter. It should not be determined by those in 
the line of succession who are directly benefited regardless of their high characters. 
I recommend that the question of " inability" be determined by the Chief Justice of the 
United States. The decision should be made by one person as the definition of 
"inability" is not subject to a group decision nor is the anonymity of a group decision 
desirable. The Constitution can be amended and the determination as to the fact or 
law of "inability" does not interfere with the separation of powers provided in the 
Constitution. 
Page 29- By C. WREDE P ETERSM EYER: 
I believe that Presidential inability should be determined only by a majority 
vote of the Cabinet and that discussions leading to such a vote should be initiated 
40 
Memoranda of Comment, Reservation or Dissent (continued) 
only by a member of the Cabinet. Removing the Vice President from the opportunity 
to initiate discussions leading to such a vote or responsibility for concurring in the 
decision will act as a shield against possible public criticism of the Vice President 
influencing for personal reasons the vote of the Cabinet. 
Page 33-By JOHN F. MERRIAM : 
I oppose the recommendation. The reasoning applicable to the determination of 
"inability" applies here as expressed in an earlier footnote. Again it is recommended 
that the Chief Justice of the United States determine the fact or law of the ending of 
Presidential "inability." 
Page 35-By JOHN F. MERRIAM: 
All of the above footnotes are, of course, applicable to the conclusions set 
forth on pages 34 and 35 . 
An omission from the policy statement that should be cured is to provide for 
the "inability" of a Vice President in the same manner as the "inability" of the 
President. 
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Increasingly close relationships are being developed with independent, 
nonpolitical research organizations in other countries. These organiza-
tions are composed of businessmen and scholars, have objectives similar 
to those of CED, and pursue them by similarly objective methods. In 
several cases, agreements for reciprocal distribution of publications 
have developed out of this cooperation. Thus, the publications of the 
following international research organizations can now be obtained in 
the United States from CED: 
CEDA 
CED TT 
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